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This research analyzes the role of prosocialness and trust in the use of water as
a limited resource under situations of competition or cooperation. For this purpose,
107 participants played the role of farmers and made decisions about irrigating their
fields in the web-based multiplayer game Irrigania. Before the simulation exercise,
participants’ prosocialness and trust levels were evaluated and they were randomly
assigned to an experimental condition (competition or cooperation). Repeated measures
analysis, using the 10 fields and the experimental conditions as factors, showed that,
in the cooperation condition, farmers and their villages used a less selfish strategy to
cultivate their fields, which produced greater benefits. Under competition, benefits to
farmers and their villages were reduced over time. Mediational analysis shows that
the selfish irrigation strategy fully mediated the relationship between prosocialness and
accumulated profits; prosocial individuals choose less selfish irrigation strategies and,
in turn, accumulated more benefit. Moreover, moderation analysis shows that trust
moderated the link between prosocialness and water use strategy by strengthening
the negative effect of prosocialness on selection of selfish strategies. The implications
of these results highlight the importance of promoting the necessary trust to develop
prosocial strategies in collectives; therefore, the efficacy of interventions, such as the
creation of cooperative educational contexts or organization of collective actions with
groups affected by water scarcity, are discussed.
Keywords: water, simulation, competition/cooperation, mediation/moderation, prosocialness, trust
THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING WATER CONSUMPTION
Water considered as the blue gold of the 21st century (Barlow and Clarke, 2005) is an increasingly
scarce natural resource (Barker et al., 2012). As Katz (2011) claims “Water has been and continues
to be a source of political conflict, at times even violent conflict, a prospect which may worsen
as populations grow, economies develop, and climatic conditions change” (p. 29). Water is an
essential to human life common pool natural resource; therefore, it is a scarce and precious
resource, particularly in places where there is a great shortage of water, mainly due to the climate,
leading to serious problems for society and for the environment. Therefore, water scarcity and
interdependent collective behavior in which individuals tend to maximize their personal benefit
create the necessary conditions for considering water consumption as a social dilemma. In this
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sense, for example, applied research has explored the positive
impact of interventions in real-world dilemmas related to water
conservation by publishing data on private consumption (Van
Vugt and Samuelson, 1999).
The way society uses common-pool natural resources is an
issue of great contemporary relevance. Gifford (2014) claims that
influences on pro-environmental behavior interact, moderate,
and mediate each other to predict certain behavioral outcomes.
It therefore seems relevant to examine the behavior associated
with water consumption from both an individual and a collective
perspective, and to analyze how certain variables influence
pro-environmental behavior. To investigate the factors and
processes underlying water use strategies, this study used a
simulation in which the participants had to make decisions
about how to use water a precious and scarce resource
under different experimental conditions: either cooperation or
competition. In short, this research aimed to analyze the role
of some dispositional variables and a situational variable, i.e.,
competition vs. cooperation, in the use of water as a limited
resource.
Social Dilemmas: Competition and
Cooperation in the Use of Water
For decades, several fields, including biology, psychology,
education, and economics, have investigated social dilemmas
(for a review see Dawes, 1980; Kollock, 1998; Balliet, 2010).
Following with the essential idea formulated by Hardin (1968),
social dilemmas are situations in which a conflict exists between
maximizing one’s individual benefit and maximizing the benefit
and wellbeing of the collective (Feeny et al., 1990; Zhong et al.,
2013). The implicit temporal dimension in social dilemmas
affects both individuals and the collective: consequences for both
the individual and the collective can be short- or long-term (Van
Lange et al., 2013). Recently Van Lange et al. (2013) theorized that
a wide variety of psychological factors play a part in determining
behavior in social dilemmas (e.g., social values and trust), and
argued that social dilemmas should be analyzed as dynamic
interactions between individual’s dispositional characteristics
(such as prosocialness or trust levels) and the group’s cooperative
situations over time. Following Sagiv et al. (2011), who claimed
that fewer studies have investigated how individual differences
(e.g., social motives) impact on cooperation and competition,
we suggest that the impact of prosocialness and trust as factors
that could trigger cooperation in social dilemmas has not been
addressed thus far.
According to Zhong et al. (2013, p. 2), “Social dilemmas
describe conflict situations existing between a rational individual
maximizing its own benefit and a social group pursuing collective
wellbeing.” In other words, individuals should make a choice by
prioritizing either the personal or the collective interest (Parks
et al., 2013). Sometimes, the apparently rational selfishness of the
individual leads to the collective becoming worse off and, thus,
the apparently rational individual also suffers from the problems
they imposed on the collective (Kollock, 1998).
From a social dilemma perspective, the decline of common-
pool natural resources happens because individuals try to
maximize their own short-term interests, regardless of the long-
term repercussions of their selfish decisions for the community
and the planet (Joireman et al., 2009). Steg and Vlek (2009)
pointed out that individuals usually justified their decisions
about environment-related behaviors in terms of choosing the
alternative that will provide the highest benefit at the lowest cost.
Nevertheless, in many cases, behavior is not planned or reasoned,
but automatic, following unconscious cognitive patterns (Steg
and Vlek, 2009). Research has shown that a prosocial disposition
makes an individual think and behave in a more collective
way, using more cooperative strategies; contrariwise, selfish
individuals tend to behave more individualistically, being more
competitive and using more selfish strategies (De Cremer and
Van Lange, 2001).
Following with the relevance of cooperation, Aumann and
Schelling (2005) claimed that cooperative behavior is primordial
and necessary to create a prosperous society, particularly in
situations of interdependence, as is the case when sharing
common-pool natural resources, where, owing to their scarcity
and exhaustibility, the situation also includes some uncertainty,
perceived vulnerability, and risk. Nevertheless, in order to
cooperate, individuals need to lay aside their self-interest to
protect the interests of others (Tomasello and Vaish, 2013).
It is also well known that interdependence situations that
involve uncertainty and risk may lead individuals to attempt to
maximize personal benefit, regardless of the potential negative
consequences of this behavior for the collective to which
they belong; sharing a limited number of resources makes
this behavioral strategy more likely (Tabernero et al., 2014;
Balliet et al., 2016). Although individuals know that cooperation
might be more beneficial for the community, there is still
a tendency to act self-sufficiently (Weber et al., 2004). On
the other hand, Kollock (1998) argued that communication
increases the frequency of cooperation rates, and several
studies have shown that cooperation increases significantly
when individuals are given the chance to talk with each other
and make public commitments (Lokhorst et al., 2009; Balliet,
2010).
However, it has also been shown that individuals tend to
use more selfish strategies and competitive behaviors when in
a competitive situation, while in cooperative contexts they tend
to be more prosocial (Reeson and Tisdell, 2010). Moreover, in a
competitive situation, the prosocial tendencies of individuals are
not maintained, and they show self-interested profit behaviors
(Reeson and Tisdell, 2010). Similarly, social dilemma research
has shown that, when resources are scarce, individuals’ behavior
becomes more selfish (Gifford, 2011b; Van Lange et al., 2013). In
this sense, Barker et al. (2012) have demonstrated that when in-
groups are exposed to competitive contexts their cooperation and
profits are reduced.
Based on this research, we predicted that, under competitive
conditions, both individuals and groups would generate lower
incomes than under cooperative conditions. We also predicted
that, in a competitive situation, both individuals and groups
would tend to adopt selfish strategies, while, in a cooperative
situation, both individuals and groups would tend to use less
selfish strategies.
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Drawing on traditional social psychology studies (Sherif,
1936), which stated that individuals need frameworks on which
to base their actions, Tabernero et al. (2007) showed that the
previous experience of a group is a fundamental factor in the
future decisions of both individual members and the group as
a whole. The competitive or cooperative culture of the group
influences how competitive or cooperative the individual and
the group will be in the future (Tabernero et al., 2007). It has
been argued that, in a competitive situation, the profits of the
individuals and the group will be reduced (Barker et al., 2012),
as a result, it is predicted that both individuals and groups will
see their net profits reduce over time when in a group with a
competitive culture, but they will see their net profits increase
over time when in a group with a cooperative culture.
H1. Individuals will earn higher net and accumulated incomes
in the cooperation condition than the competition
condition.
H2. Individuals in the competition condition will see their
net profits reduce over time, whilst individuals in the
cooperation condition will see their net profits increase
over time.
H3. In the competition condition, individuals will use a
selfish strategy, while, in the cooperation condition, both
individuals and villages will use more prosocial irrigation
strategies.
Psychosocial Variables Related with
Pro-environmental Behavior
As it is formulated in the Cognitive Affective Personality
System (CAPS; Mendoza-Denton et al., 2001), situations and
dispositional characteristics of individuals interact with each
other and, consequently, influence individual behavior. As
such, in this section, we will focus on the importance of
specific psychosocial variables that may affect individual pro-
environmental behavior.
The more that individuals perceive environmental threats
to their wellbeing, such as water scarcity, the more likely
they are to engage in environmental practices, such as water
conservation (Baldassare and Katz, 1992). In this sense, for
example, Niles et al. (2013) recently reported that farmers who
are very concerned about the risk of climate change also tend
to be more concerned about forthcoming climate-change-related
regulations and the plausible impact they may have for the
planet. There is, however, a great variability in the concerns
that individuals and collectives have about environmental threats.
Scientists are therefore interested in the psychological variables
related to pro-environmental behaviors and their psychological
determinants (Markowitz et al., 2012). According to Cornelissen
et al. (2011) and the Social Intuitionist Model’s (Haidt, 2001),
an important determinant of the variability in the prosocial
behavior of individuals is referred to in terms of social value
orientations (SVO) prosocial or proself. SVO are automatic
judgments that activate a behavioral pattern and a tendency to
either cooperate or to compete. In the same way, Kaiser and
Byrka (2011) have shown that environmentalists people with
pro-environmental orientation are prone to act in a prosocial
way and have a propensity to be more cooperative on behalf
of the collective. These studies suggest that individuals differ
along a ‘prosocial propensity dimension’ (Kaiser and Byrka,
2011), and that this dimension can affect the extent to which
an individual’s dispositions and behaviors are prosocial or
proself, and competitive or cooperative (Kaiser and Byrka,
2011). Another relevant variable, in terms of pro-environmental
behaviors and the changes in such behaviors, is trust (Parks et al.,
2013). Mistrust has been conceived as an important barrier to
pro-environmental behavioral change (Gifford, 2011a).
Accordingly, in the next to subsection, we will focus on the
relation between prosocialness, trust, and pro-environmental
behavior.
Prosocialness and Pro-environmental Behavior
Lehmann (1999) hypothesized that people with a highly selfish
orientation are less prone to behave ecologically. According to
De Cremer and Van Lange (2001), there is evidence that people
with a prosocial disposition show higher rates of cooperation
in a variety of settings. These authors have demonstrated that
individuals with a highly prosocial disposition tend to place
more importance on cooperation (rather than competition) in
social dilemmas, looking for greater opportunities to improve
collective results and equality of results or income. As has
previously been pointed out, the automatic judgments implicit in
social value orientations activate a cooperative behavioral pattern
(Cornelissen et al., 2011), showing that the ‘prosocial propensity
dimension’ along which individuals differ affects the extent to
which an individual’s behavior will be prosocial or proself (Kaiser
and Byrka, 2011).
In accordance with these results, it is predicted that individuals
with a highly prosocial disposition will adopt less selfish
water irrigation strategies, regardless of whether they are in a
cooperation or competition situation. In view of our earlier
argumentation that when individuals adopt more competitive,
more selfish strategies their profits are reduced (Barker et al.,
2012), it is predicted that water irrigation strategies will mediate
the relation between prosocial disposition and profits.
H4. Controlling the effect of experimental conditions (cooperation
vs. competition), selfish strategies will mediate the relation
between prosocialness and accumulated income, such that
individuals with the most strongly prosocial disposition
will use less selfish strategies, which will result in higher
accumulated income.
Trust and Pro-environmental Behaviors
Trust is fundamental to healthy relationships based on
cooperation and unselfish relational strategies. As Twenge
et al. (2007) argued, trust is a sine qua non of cooperation.
When individuals mistrust the goodwill of another, they tend
not to engage in prosocial behaviors or provide help. Trust is a
dispositional variable that affects the decision to cooperate or
defect in social dilemmas (Parks et al., 2013). Like dispositional
prosocialness, trust predisposes individuals to act prosocially.
It has been shown that individuals who place high levels of
trust in others tend to use less selfish strategies and engage
in more cooperative behaviors (Parks et al., 1996). Gupta and
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Ogden (2009) have shown that ‘high thrusters’ engage in more
pro-environmental actions than ‘low thrusters’.
With regard to common-pool natural resources and pro-
environmental behaviors, it must be recognized that trust may
have a special relevance in situations of perceived vulnerability,
such as when individuals are sharing a limited, scarce, and
precious natural resource, such as water. When individuals assess
a situation as risky and believe that their resources are in danger
and could be exploited by others (McCarter et al., 2011), i.e.,
when they feel very vulnerable, their trust levels must be high
if they are to behave prosocially and engage in cooperative pro-
environmental behaviors.
Parks et al. (2013) argued that trust moderates the effect
of social values orientations (such as prosocial disposition) on
cooperation, and that prosocial individuals tend to use less selfish
strategies and to be more cooperative. We can, thus, hypothesize
that, when prosocial individuals place high trust in the prosocial
propensity of others, they will tend to be even more cooperative
and to use even less selfish strategies than when they do not
trust in the prosocial propensity of others. Contrariwise, when
proself individuals lack trust in the prosocial propensity of
others, they will tend to be even more selfish in their use of
strategies than when they trust in the prosocial propensity of
others. We predicted that trust would moderate the relationship
between prosocialness and water irrigation strategies, regardless
of whether individuals are in a situation of competition or
cooperation.
H5. Controlling the effect of experimental conditions (cooperation
vs. competition), trust will moderate the relation between
prosocialness and selfish strategies, such that trust will
strengthen the negative association between prosocial
disposition and selfish strategies.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The participants were 107 students of Environmental Sciences
Degrees from the University of Córdoba, 70.5% women and
29.5% men. The mean age was 21.28 years (SD = 2.18; range
18–27 years).
Task and Procedure
Task
Irrigania is a game about the shared used of limited water
resources, which is played by several interacting participants
(Seibert and Vis, 2012; Ewen and Seibert, 2016). The game
is implemented as a web-based software and can be played
with one computer per student using any web browser. In the
game, there are different villages, each comprising a number of
farmers. Each farmer (participant) has to maximize net income
by deciding how to use their 10 fields each year (the game ran
for 10 years). Three irrigation options are available, each with
different associated costs and revenues reflecting some aspects
of reality. Players could choose between (1) rainfed agriculture:
low costs, and low revenue; (2) river water irrigation: high,
but fixed cost, revenues high, but reduction if the river water
has to be distributed among too many fields in a village; and
(3) groundwater-based irrigation: costs increase if the depth
of groundwater increases due to overuse, fixed high revenue.
Farmers have to choose the number of fields for each of the
three options for each round (year). The game is designed so
that only a few fields per village can sustainably be irrigated
with river water and groundwater, respectively. If more fields
are irrigated in one of these two ways, the revenue is reduced
(river water) or groundwater levels drop and irrigating with
this source of water becomes more expensive up to the point
where the costs exceed the income. An important difference
between the two ways of irrigation is that there is a memory
from year to year for groundwater (carry-over of deficits),
whereas, for river water, each year is evaluated independently
(no carry-over of deficits). Weather conditions for each year
vary randomly between three different states (wet, normal, dry),
which changes the number of fields that can be irrigated without
overusing resources. The weather conditions also influence the
income for the rainfed fields, which increases for wet years
and decreases for dry years. Simplifying assumptions in the
game are that groundwater and river water are independent
and that the different villages do not influence each other.
The exact game settings and equations are described and
discussed by Seibert and Vis (2012) and Ewen and Seibert
(2016).
Procedure
Participation in the study contributed toward participants’
degrees, and students participated voluntarily and were informed
that the data will be analyzed anonymously and that they
can leave the experiment when they wanted. Neither written
informed consent nor any ethics committee approval was
required before the study began according to the regulations by
the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation.
Before playing the game, participants completed an on-line
survey to provide data on socio-demographic and dispositional
variables (first phase). Participants took, on average, 15 min to
complete the survey, and their anonymity was guaranteed. In
a second phase, participants were randomly assigned to one of
two experimental conditions (cooperation or competition) and,
finally, in a third phase, participants played the Irrigania game.
Participants took between 52 and 84 min to complete the 10
simulated years of the game.
Game information was collected via record sheets that
were designed so that each participant could register all
of their decisions and achievements. On the record sheet,
participants provided information related to the simulation, such
as farmer name, village name, village group name, farmer’s
decisions (annually: the number of rainfed fields, fields irrigated
with groundwater, and fields irrigated with river water), and
the outcomes of the simulation (net income per year and
accumulated income).
In the first phase of the experiment, participants completed an
online questionnaire that was created with the Global Park survey
program. They were informed that they would have to do a group
task online with other participants. In this phase, and before the
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group tasks, the socio-demographic and dispositional variables
were assessed (prosocialness and trust).
In the second phase, participants were randomly assigned to
one of two experimental conditions, cooperation or competition
(cooperation N = 52; competition N = 55). Participants in
the cooperation condition could talk to each other with their
village’ members about strategies and income whilst they were
playing the game (at the end of the years 3, 6, and 9), in order
to create a cooperative atmosphere (Kollock, 1998; Lokhorst
et al., 2009; Balliet, 2010) in which they can share information
about whether strategies were advantageous or not. Moreover,
a village-interested objective was introduced to them: they were
informed that their main aim in the game was not only to obtain
higher individual incomes but also to obtain higher incomes
at the village level. In contrast, in the competition condition,
no interaction was allowed (at the end of years 3, 6, and 9,
the only information available to participants was the recent
annual incomes of other village members), and a self-interested
objective was introduced to them: they were informed that their
main objective was to obtain higher individual incomes. Nineteen
villages played in the competition condition, and eighteen villages
played in the cooperation condition. In each session, there were
approximately 15 farmers, and the majority of villages had 3
farmers (mean= 2.89; min= 2, max= 3).
Finally, in the third phase participants played the Irrigania
game (Seibert and Vis, 2012). Once participants completed the
game, debriefing information was created and all participants
received a seminar about solving social dilemmas associated with
scarcity of natural resources.
Measures
Prosocialness
Prosocialness (α = 0.84) was measured using a short version
of the Prosocialness Scale (Caprara et al., 2005), which assesses
the extent to which individuals engage in sharing, helping,
taking care of other’s needs, and empathizing with their feelings.
Participants recorded their answers to the 12 items (e.g., ‘I try to
console people who are sad’) on a 7-point Likert scale.
Trust
Trust (α = 0.87) was measured by adapting the scale used
by Greenhalgh and Chapman (1998). The scale has four items
and uses a seven-point Likert scale (e.g., ‘I feel that people
can be counted on to help me’) that reflect the confidence
participants have in the prosocial propensity of others. The scale
was presented before the participants were assigned to groups for
the online tasks.
Analytical Strategies and Decision-Making
In order to measure analytical strategies and decision-making we
used the Irrigania simulation game, in which a number of fields
are allocated to players, and each player decides how to irrigate
each of their fields every year.
Selfish irrigation strategy
This was indexed as the difference between the number of
fields under groundwater irrigation and the number of fields
under rainfed agriculture (groundwater irrigation - rainfed
agriculture), using the SPSS program. To generate the “selfish
irrigation” measure, we selected groundwater irrigation and
rainfed agriculture as the most extreme strategies, selfish and
prosocial, respectively, while river water irrigation was not
considered for the calculation.
Annual and accumulated income
Annual income depended on weather conditions during the
previous year, the type of irrigation chosen, and how the other
farmers used the water resources. Accumulated income was
calculated for years 1 through 10 as the sum of annual income
through the 10 years.
Statistical Analyses
Data were analyzed using SPSS v21. Repeated measure analyses
were used to scrutinize the changes over time in the
overall sample and in each of the experimental conditions.
ANOVAs were performed to explore differences between the
cooperation and competition conditions. A mediational analysis
was performed by using the Process procedure for SPSS (Hayes,
2013) in order to investigate whether water use strategies
mediated the relation between prosocialness and accumulated
incomes. A moderation analysis was also performed using
Process procedure for SPSS (Hayes, 2013) to corroborate the
moderating role of trust in the relation between prosocialness and
water use strategies.
RESULTS
Effect of the Experimental Condition on
Net and Accumulated Incomes (H1)
The repeated measure analyses (by including the 10 years of
accumulated incomes as repeated factor) revealed a significant
overall time effect [F(9,98) = 459.52, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.98;
O = 1.00] over the accumulated incomes throughout the
10 years of the simulation for the complete sample as a
whole, as well as a significant time effect for the evolution
of accumulated incomes throughout the 10 years in both
cooperation [F(9,459) = 591.79, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.99;
O = 1.00] and competition [F(9,46) = 192.80, p < 0.001;
η2 = 0.97; O = 1.00] conditions (see Figure 1). When
including the experimental condition as between-factor (mixed
repeated measure analysis), the significant effect of time remain
[F(9,97) = 461.68, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.98; O = 1.00], a
marginal main effect of the experimental condition is observed
[F(1,105) = 3.09, p < 0.09, η2 = 0.03; O = 0.41], and an
interactive effect between time and the experimental condition
is observed [F(9,97)= 5.94, p< 0.001; η2 = 0.36; O= 1.00].
ANOVAs were used to assess whether the experimental
condition (competition vs. cooperation) affected net and
accumulated incomes. The results exhibited a significant effect on
accumulated income in the 10th year, as well as on the average
of net incomes over the 10 years. As expected, individuals in
the cooperation competition accumulated higher incomes in the
last year of the simulation than individuals in the competition
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FIGURE 1 | Accumulated and net income across the 10 years of the simulation at the individual level for both cooperation and competition
conditions. Village level data were almost the same as the individual level data.
condition [F(1,106) = 5.37, p < 0.02]. Moreover, the average
of net incomes was higher for individuals in the cooperation
condition than for individuals in the competition condition
[Mcoop = 417.27, SD = 56.19; Mcomp = 333.55, SD = 272.47;
F(1,106)= 4.72, p< 0.03].
In order to analyze village incomes, a transformation of
the matrix was constructed using aggregate measures, for 107
farmers in 37 villages. To support the aggregation, we calculated
inter-member reliability (ICC1 and ICC2) and tested whether
mean scores differed significantly across groups (indicated by
an F-test from a one-way ANOVA contrasting group means
on each variable). ICC1 indicates the proportion of variance
in ratings due to group membership, whereas ICC2 indicates
the reliability of group mean differences (Bliese, 2000). Good
support for aggregation was obtained for all the net incomes,
except for year 1 (Table 1); as such, these results demonstrated
that the experimental groups actually acted as if consisting of
team members who share a common strategy. The results of the
analyses at the village level were similar to those at the individual
level (see Appendix 1).
These results confirmed that, at both the individual and
collective levels, both the net and the accumulated incomes at the
end of the simulation were higher for the cooperation condition
than for the competition condition (Figure 1).
Evolution of Net Income Over Time
According to Experimental Condition
(H2)
The repeated measure analyses (including the first and the 10th
years of net incomes as factor) of the complete sample as a
whole showed significant differences in the evolution of the
net income from the first to the 10th years across the two
conditions [F(1,106) = 62.52, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.37; O = 1.00].
Moreover, as Figure 1 shows, the repeated measure analyses
performed separately with each group showed that, in both
the competition [F(1,54) = 31.14, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.37;
O = 1.00] and cooperation [F(1,51) = 169.42, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.77; O = 1.00] conditions, individuals saw their incomes
significantly reduce between the first and the 10th year. When
doing a mixed ANOVA by including the experimental condition
(cooperation vs. competition) as interpersonal factor (between
factor), the results showed that the main effect of time remain
[F(1,105) = 64.65, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.38; O = 1.00], a main effect
of the experimental condition is observed [F(1,105) = 12.79,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.11; O = 0.94], and a interactive effect
is observed showing that the reduction o net income is
significantly greater for individuals in the competition condition
[F(1,105) = 6.67, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.06; O = 0.73]. Hypothesis 2
was therefore partially confirmed.
The results at the village level were similar to those at the
individual level, as can be seen in Appendix 2.
Differences in the Use of Water
Strategies According to the
Experimental Condition (H3)
We performed ANOVAs to evaluate the irrigation strategies
followed by both the cooperation and competition experimental
TABLE 1 | Inter-member reliability and differences in mean scores across
groups on the net income variable.
F(36,106) ICC1 ICC2
Net income yr1 1.25 (ns) 0.08 0.20
Net income yr2 2.95∗∗∗ 0.40 0.66
Net income yr3 4.36∗∗∗ 0.54 0.77
Net income yr4 3.17∗∗∗ 0.43 0.68
Net income yr5 10.56∗∗∗ 0.77 0.90
Net income yr6 1.64∗ 0.18 0.39
Net income yr7 6.79∗∗∗ 0.67 0.85
Net income yr8 1.50† 0.15 0.33
Net income yr9 2.30∗∗∗ 0.31 0.56
Net income yr10 3.10∗∗∗ 0.42 0.68
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.07; ICC, Inter-class correlation.
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FIGURE 2 | Number of fields irrigated with groundwater and rainfed agriculture across the simulation.
conditions. In the competition condition participants used a
more selfish strategy, which resulted in a higher number of
fields being irrigated with groundwater (Figure 2). On average,
over the 10 years, individuals in the competition condition
used significantly more groundwater irrigation than individuals
in the cooperation condition [Mcomp = 2.89, SD = 1.08;
Mcoop= 2.37, SD= 0.62; F(1,106)= 9.25, p< 0.01].
Participants in the cooperation condition cultivated a higher
number of fields with rainfed agriculture and, thus, used
a more prosocial strategy (Figure 2). On average, over the
10 years, individuals in the cooperation condition irrigated
significantly more fields with rainfed agriculture than individuals
in the competition condition [Mcoop = 3.93, SD = 0.87;
Mcomp= 3.46, SD= 1.09; F(1,106)= 5.82, p< 0.02].
The results at the village level were similar to those at the
individual level, as can be seen in Appendix 3.
Mediating Role of Water Use Strategies
on Profits (H4)
In order to test the prediction that water use strategies
would mediate the effects of prosocialness on profits,
mediation analyses, using Process procedure (Hayes, 2013),
were performed; first, without controlling the effect of the
experimental condition as covariate; and, then, by controlling
the effect of the experimental condition as covariate. At the
first step, prosocialness was introduced as independent variable
(IV); the mean of selfish irrigation strategy of 5 years previous
to the last year of the simulation was introduced as mediator;
and the accumulated incomes of the 10th year were introduced
as dependent variable (DV). At the second step, in addition to
those variables, we also introduced the experimental condition
as covariate (coded as −5.00 for competition and 5.00 for
cooperation). Since the Process procedure does not accept lost
data, these were replaced by the mean of the series. Moreover,
for all the quantitative variables, the z scores were used. The
95% confidence interval of the indirect effect was obtained with
10,000 bootstrap resamples. As shown in Table 2, the results
of the analyses revealed that the selfish irrigation strategies
significantly mediated the relation between prosocialness
and accumulated income. Moreover, when introducing the
experimental condition as covariate, the indirect effect of
prosocialness on the accumulated incomes remained significant.
Hypothesis 4 was thus supported.
Moderating Role of Trust (H5)
Moderation analysis was performed using Process procedure
in SPSS (Hayes, 2013) in order to confirm Hypothesis 5.
Prosocialness was introduced as IV; trust and the experimental
condition as moderators; and the selfish irrigation strategies as
DV. The experimental condition was introduced as moderator,
in order to assess whether or not the possible moderator effect of
trust is affected by the experimental condition. Since the Process
program does not accept lost data, these were replaced by the
mean of the series. Moreover, for all the quantitative variables,
the z scores were used. The 95% confidence interval of the
indirect effect was obtained with 10,000 bootstrap resamples. As
Table 3 and Figure 3 show, the results revealed that trust levels
strengthen the negative effect that prosocialness had on the selfish
irrigation strategies, and that the experimental condition does
not moderate the relation between prosocialness and the selfish
irrigation strategy. Thus, H5 was confirmed.
DISCUSSION
In our modern and occidental societies competition and
maximizing own profit are common frameworks toward
resources use; and when framed in competitive situations, the
maximization of the own interest increases (Steg and Vlek, 2009).
This has obviously negative repercussion for society and the
planet. The results of this study seem to indicate that changing
this frame by focusing on a more cooperative framework would
benefit individual and collective profit as well as resources
conservation. The present study showed that, in a simulation,
farmers and their respective villages working under competitive
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 May 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 694
fpsyg-08-00694 May 4, 2017 Time: 18:11 # 8
Cuadrado et al. Prosocialness and Trust in Water Use Strategies
TA
B
LE
2
|M
o
d
el
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
fo
r
th
e
m
ed
ia
ti
o
na
lp
ro
ce
ss
m
o
d
el
w
it
h
an
d
w
it
ho
ut
th
e
ex
p
er
im
en
ta
lc
o
nd
it
io
n
as
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
b
le
.
M
ed
ia
ti
o
na
lp
ro
ce
ss
m
o
d
el
w
it
ho
ut
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
b
y
th
e
ex
p
er
im
en
ta
lc
o
nd
it
io
n
as
co
va
ri
at
e
M
ed
ia
ti
o
na
lp
ro
ce
ss
m
o
d
el
b
y
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
w
it
h
th
e
ex
p
er
im
en
ta
lc
o
nd
it
io
n
as
co
va
ri
at
e
C
o
ns
eq
ue
nt
C
o
ns
eq
ue
nt
S
el
fi
sh
ir
ri
g
at
io
n
st
ra
te
g
y
A
cc
um
ul
at
ed
in
co
m
es
(Y
)
S
el
fi
sh
ir
ri
g
at
io
n
st
ra
te
g
y
A
cc
um
ul
at
ed
in
co
m
es
(Y
)
A
nt
ec
ed
en
t
C
o
ef
f.
S
E
p
C
o
ef
f.
S
E
p
C
o
ef
f.
S
E
p
C
o
ef
f.
S
E
p
X
(P
ro
so
ci
al
ne
ss
)
a
−0
.2
2
0.
10
<
0.
05
c′
0.
13
0.
10
ns
A
−0
.2
2
0.
10
<
0.
05
c′
0.
12
0.
09
ns
M
(S
el
fis
h
irr
ig
at
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
)
–
–
–
b
−0
.4
6
0.
09
<
0.
00
1
–
–
–
b 1
−0
.4
3
0.
09
<
0.
00
1
C
ov
ar
ia
te
(E
xp
.C
on
d.
)
–
–
–
–
–
B
2
–
–
–
b 2
0.
02
0.
02
ns
In
te
rc
ep
t
i 1
−0
.0
1
0.
10
ns
i 2
0.
01
0.
09
ns
i 1
−0
.0
1
0.
10
ns
i 2
0.
01
0.
08
ns
R
2
=
0.
04
R
2
=
0.
25
R
2
=
0.
04
R
2
=
0.
26
F
(1
,1
05
)=
4.
59
,p
<
0.
05
F
(2
,1
04
)=
16
.8
9,
p
<
0.
00
1
F
(1
,1
05
)=
4.
59
,p
<
0.
05
F
(3
,1
03
)=
11
.7
8,
p
<
0.
00
1
C
on
di
tio
na
li
nd
ire
ct
ef
fe
ct
95
%
B
o
o
ts
tr
ap
C
If
o
ri
nd
ir
ec
t
ef
fe
ct
S
o
b
el
Te
st
95
%
B
o
o
ts
tr
ap
C
If
o
ri
nd
ir
ec
t
ef
fe
ct
S
o
b
el
Te
st
−0
.0
01
to
0.
44
4
z
S
E
p
−0
.0
01
to
0.
45
0
Z
S
E
P
1.
95
0.
05
<
0.
05
1.
93
0.
05
<
0.
05
X,
in
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
(P
ro
so
ci
al
ne
ss
);
M
,m
ed
ia
to
r
(S
el
fis
h
irr
ig
at
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
);
Ex
p.
C
on
d,
ex
pe
rim
en
ta
lc
on
di
tio
n;
Y,
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
(a
cc
um
ul
at
ed
in
co
m
es
).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 May 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 694
fpsyg-08-00694 May 4, 2017 Time: 18:11 # 9
Cuadrado et al. Prosocialness and Trust in Water Use Strategies
TABLE 3 | Model coefficients for the moderating effect of trust in the link between prosocialness and selfish irrigation strategies.
Coeff. SE T p
X (Prosocialness) b1 −0.19 0.10 −1.90 <0.06
M(Trust) b2 −0.12 0.10 −1.15 ns
W (Experimental condition) b3 −0.04 0.02 −2.05 <0.05
XM (Prosocialness × trust) b4 0.22 0.11 2.03 <0.05
XW (Prosocialness × Experimental condition) b5 −0.01 0.02 −0.19 ns
Intercept i1 −0.03 0.09 −0.32 ns
R2 = 0.13
F (5,101) = 3.04, p < 0.01
Interaction 1 (XM) Interaction 2 (XW) Both
R2 change due to interactions 1R2 = 0.04 1R2 = 0.01 1R2 = 0.04
F (1,101) = 4.11, p < 0.05 F (1,101) = 0.03, ns F (2,101) = 2.08, ns
X, independent variable; M, moderator 1; W, moderator 2.
FIGURE 3 | Moderating role of trust in the link between prosocialness and use of selfish irrigation strategies.
conditions earned consistently lower incomes; these results could
be explained in terms of the use of more selfish strategies, lower
prosocial tendencies, and lower trust levels.
In a cooperative situation, both individuals and groups obtain
higher benefits, both net and accumulated, than in a competitive
situation, a result in accordance with previous studies (Barker
et al., 2012). Moreover, the results of the study also showed that
competitive and cooperative situations affect (a) the evolution
of the net profits of individuals and groups over time, and (b)
the irrigation strategies chosen by both individuals and groups.
We found that (a) the net profits of individuals and groups
diminished significantly more over time in the competition
condition than in the cooperation condition, as Barker et al.
(2012) hypothesized; and (b) that individuals in competitive
groups tend to choose less pro-environmental and more selfish
strategies than individuals and groups in cooperative situations
(Reeson and Tisdell, 2010). It is noteworthy that, meanwhile
our second hypothesis Individuals in the competition condition
will see their net profits reduce over time, whilst individuals
in the cooperation condition will see their net profits increase
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over time was not completely confirmed, the reduction of net
profits over time was lower when individuals were framed in
a cooperation situation. Note that the most prosocial strategy
rainfed agriculture used especially by the participants in the
cooperation condition, is also the one with the lower revenue
(but also the lower costs), and this could have contributed to the
not expected reduction of the profits obtained by participants in
the cooperation condition. Interestingly, despite the reduction
of the incomes over time obtained with the prosocial strategy,
participants in the cooperation condition continue to opt for
the prosocial strategy; and this decision enhanced finally their
benefits to the long-term. Once again, this result strengthens
the idea of changing the predominant occidental competitive
framework toward sharing resources by promoting cooperative
environments for the benefit of individual, societies and the
planet.
Furthermore, people usually base their own decisions, in
part, on the decisions and behaviors they have observed in
others, reciprocation providing one example of this (Joireman
et al., 2009). In our study, when participants took part in
the simulation, they could see the decisions of other farmers
onscreen, and this may have ‘interfered’ with their eventual
decision, making it more or less selfish according to the decisions
of other participants. Sherif (1936) argued that individuals need
to base their actions on frameworks; a cooperative or competitive
context might act as a framework and lead individuals to act in
accordance with this framework. When a group of people has to
share a limited number of resources, there is a tendency to behave
selfishly, even if individuals know that mutual cooperation will
lead to greater benefits for more people.
Our results seem to corroborate the theories which hold that
selfish and self-sufficient behaviors are increased in competitive
situations (Weber et al., 2004), and that such self-sufficient
behavior has a negative impact in the long-term, not just for
the planet and for society in general, when considering natural
common-pool resources, but also for the individuals and groups
that act self-sufficiently. As Kollock (1998) argued, the apparent
rationality of self-sufficient behavior when resources are scarce
is not supported by empirical evidence, which has shown that
this strategy is detrimental to the individual and the planet.
Our results also showed that net benefits for individuals and
groups were increasingly and significantly reduced over time in
the competitive condition. This suggests that individuals and
groups in competitive situations cannot escape the vicious circle
in which they are caught and so conflict escalates, becoming
more destructive and serious over time. As early as 1990, Deutsch
(1990) was claiming that competition tends to escalate into
destructive conflict. Nonetheless, our hypothesis that net incomes
would increase over time for individuals and groups in the
cooperation condition was not confirmed. This is probably due
to the fact that, although individuals are in a cooperative context,
the goal of the game is competitive and, therefore, the scarcity
of resources leads individuals to display some competitive
and self-sufficient behaviors (Weber et al., 2004), even in the
cooperation condition. Nevertheless, the results showed that,
when comparing with competitive situations, the reduction in net
income over time in the cooperative condition was significantly
lower, both at individual and group level. Cooperation seems to
act as a protective factor against the conflict escalation that occurs
as a result of the scarcity of resources.
In accordance with Sherif (1936) and Tabernero et al. (2007),
the data on the irrigation strategies used in the competition
condition more selfish and less pro-environmental and
cooperation condition more prosocial and pro-environmental
seem to confirm that the competitive or cooperative culture of
the in-group influences the behavior of individuals, providing
them with a framework on which to base their actions. The
more feedback individuals receive about the competitive culture
of the group, the more their behavior reflects the competitive
context: they act self-sufficiently and make less profit. This
suggests that individuals and groups should be provided with
some sort of cooperative framework for environment-related
decision making, perhaps by creating formative and educational
programs that allow individuals to experience (a) cooperation
and (b) the benefits that cooperation has at a practical level, both
for themselves and for society, as well as for the environment,
which ultimately has a further impact on them.
Most authors (Lehmann, 1999; De Cremer and Van Lange,
2001; Cornelissen et al., 2011; Kaiser and Byrka, 2011) agree
that prosocial tendencies affect the extent to which individuals
behave in a prosocial or proself manner. Our study has shown
that individuals with higher prosocialness (a more prosocial
disposition) choose more prosocial and pro-environmental
irrigation strategies than individuals with lower prosocialness.
It seems that dispositional prosocialness can activate a prosocial
and pro-environmental pattern of behavior, increasing behaviors
that tend to benefit other people and the environment, such as
the pro-environmental and prosocial strategies in our simulation.
This indicates the importance of educational programs oriented
to developing empathy and prosocial dispositions in both
children and adults. Our results have also shown that irrigation
strategies, in turn, predict incomes, i.e., selfish irrigation
strategies fully mediated the relation between prosocialness and
profit, such that the more prosocial an individual’s disposition,
the less selfish the irrigation strategy they choose and the greater
the resultant profit. Once again, this suggests that social and
educational programs that can show individuals the benefits for
oneself, for society, and for the planet of investment in prosocial
strategies and pro-environmental behaviors should be promoted.
As Gifford (2014) argues, both knowledge of and education about
environmental problems are important factors and agents of
change in pro-environmental behaviors. This study and others
(Kaiser and Byrka, 2011) have found that, whereas altruistic
and prosocial individuals tend to behave in a pro-environmental
way, less prosocial individuals tend to pursue self-enhancement
through consuming natural resources regardless of the impact
such behavior has on other people and the planet; it seems that
educational programs would benefit from taking into account the
influence of dispositional variables and promoting prosocialness
in students and adults.
Given that the results reinforce the thesis focused on
the importance of generating confidence for developing less
selfish strategies to solve social dilemmas (Van Lange et al.,
2013), an important implication of the study focuses on the
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need to promote group interactions and community meetings
over time among groups affected by water scarcity. Previous
research has shown (see Ledyard, 1995) that face-to-face
meetings prevent uncertainty and vulnerability, as well as
facilitating communication, the development of joint strategies,
and commitment to the development of collective actions. The
individual commitment to contribute to the collective correlates
with the expectation of the prosocial behavior of the others
(Messick, 1999). In addition, individuals tend to cooperate with
those who identify as more prosocial (Feinberg et al., 2014),
since the interaction experience can be used to guide how much
trust individuals should invest in a given partner (Barclay, 2004).
Thus, in future, it would be interesting to investigate if greater
prosocialness dispositions can be developed in individuals and
collectives by promoting group interactions and community
meetings in situations of scarcity of resources.
Finally, the study showed that trust acts as a moderating
variable on the relation between prosocialness and selection
of selfish strategies, such that trust strengthens the negative
effect of dispositional prosocialness on selection of selfish
strategies. In other words, prosocialness predicts less selfish
strategies, and low trust levels reinforce this relation, whereas
high levels of trust do not significantly alter the effect of
a prosocial disposition on the selection of selfish strategies.
Therefore, proself individuals who lack trust in the prosocialness
of others tend to use even more selfish strategies than proself
individuals who place high trust in the prosocial disposition
of others. The study seems to indicate that, in situations
of perceived vulnerability and when dealing with common-
pool natural resources, high trust levels are a prerequisite for
engaging in cooperative pro-environmental behaviors, especially
for individuals with low prosocial tendencies. This is in
concordance with previous studies that have shown that trust
promotes cooperation (Gupta and Ogden, 2009; Parks et al.,
2013), as well as those which argued that trust probably
moderates the effect of individual disposition on cooperation
(Parks et al., 2013). Trust seems to be a relevant variable when
considering practical ways of promoting pro-environmental
behavior.
Limitations
A larger and more heterogeneous particularly with respect to
degree subject sample would have been advantageous. It would
have been especially beneficial to have a sample of farmers, as they
would probably have had more knowledge relevant to the theme
of the simulation. In future investigations, it would be interesting
to explore other variables that have been shown to have an effect
on behavior in social dilemmas, such as self-efficacy. Investigating
differences between students of science and arts degrees in terms
of previous knowledge of environmental issues and prosocial
disposition would also be useful.
CONCLUSION
This investigation has explored the role of prosocialness and trust
in people’s decision-making with respect to environmental issues
specifically the use of water, a limited essential resource and the
importance of cooperation in decision-making about common-
pool resources. It has shown that there are significant differences
between levels of pro-environmental behavior under cooperation
and competition conditions. As discussed before, in cooperative
conditions the water-use strategies chosen were less selfish and
more prosocial and pro-environmental, and this, in turn, affected
both net and accumulated income, such that they were higher
in the cooperation condition than in the competition condition.
This is due to the fact that, in the competition condition,
groundwater irrigation was the most frequently used strategy
and, while this produces a higher income in the short term, the
cost is higher, and thus long-term over-use of this strategy will
reduce profits. In the cooperation condition, participants focused
more on the common wealth and made more use of rainfed
agriculture, thus obtaining a higher income over the long term.
Our study has demonstrated how irrigation strategy mediates
the relation between prosocialness and cumulative incomes.
Participants with a more prosocial disposition chose less
selfish water consumption strategies, and obtained higher
cumulative incomes than individuals who used more selfish
irrigation strategies. On the other hand, it has shown that
trust moderates the relation between prosocialness and selfish
irrigation strategies, strengthening the negative association
between these two variables. Prosocial individuals with high trust
levels behave in an even less selfish way than prosocial individuals
with low trust levels.
In conclusion, we would like to reaffirm the relevance,
highlighted by Niles et al. (2013), of programs that provide
technical assistance aimed at incentivizing voluntary changes
in practice through which the agricultural community could
achieve environmental benchmarks. Our results suggested that
participating in cooperative actions could constitute relevant
previous experience for individuals and farmers, promoting
development of a cooperative framework that would, in turn,
promote more pro-environmental actions at both the individual
and collective level, which, consequently, would have benefits for
the environment.
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